CEPR Conference on Monetary Policy Design and Communication

In light of the relevance of communication by central banks. However, what constitutes best practice in this area is lively debated. In an environment of imperfect knowledge, communication may prove misleading and counterproductive. The conference aims to cast light on this, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. Examples of questions the organizers we would like the contributions to focus on are: - What information should a central bank disclose to the public and what are the most efficient channels for doing so? - More generally, what factors explain differences in transparency and communications practices across CBs? - How does communication interact with learning and the formation of expectations by the public in environments with imperfect knowledge? - Is there a trade-off between influencing expectations through communication and extracting information about the economy from them? - What is the role of communication complexity in the selection and design of robust policy rules? - How can the effects of increased transparency be measured and evaluated? - Have central banks become more predictable? And if so, to what extent can this be attributed to changes in central bank communication? [Link(scroll down)]